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Abstract 
This paper aims to analyze the effects of paddy-field consolidation projects by using 
the stochastic model. Empirical results showed that the degree of effects, realized as 
a rise in rental rate and rental-area, vary in each region and that several factors 
influencing the project effects can be evaluated quantitatively.   
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Introduction 
Improving rice productivity is a critical issue in Japanese rice production because 
the average management scale of each farmer is about 1 hectare (ha) and still little 
progress has been made in this improvement for many years. To overcome this 
situation, focus on agricultural policy is now stimulating Paddy-field Rental 
Transactions (PRTs) along with public investment as seen by Paddy-field 
Consolidation (PC) Projects (Fig. 1). In Japan, more than 15% of the agricultural 
budget has been spent on PC projects. Consequently, 60% of the total paddy-fields 
have been consolidated from small paddy-fields of irregular-shape to efficient fields 
endowed with standardized large parcels of farmland (over 0.3 ha), irrigation and 
drainage canals and brunch roads. 
Ideally, the effects of PC projects are realized in two aspects. The first effect is 
improvement of agricultural productivity by modernization of agriculture with large 
agricultural machinery, high flexibility of water management and betterment of less 
fertile soil. In other words, this effect is revealed by a high rental rate as a shadow 
price of farmland through the process of increasing farmland quality. The second 
effect is realized as the scale merit in rice production by accelerating intensive 
farmland use by efficient large scale farmers. Since the PC projects break old 
farmland ownership and establish new ownership or usage rights, implementation 
of the projects stimulate PRTs even though many paddy-fields belong to small-scale 
farmers. To substantiate these two effects, researchers need to demonstrate not only 
an ascent in the rental rate related to the improvement of productivity, but also an 
increase in the scale of management by efficient farmers through PRTs. 
Previous studies suggested difficulty in farmland reallocation among farmers by 
the aggregate production function approach providing low elasticity of farmland 
with regard to the rental rate (Godo, 1993 and Ito, 1993). Hedonic price analyses 
tried to find the causative factors on farmland values by considering of soil   4
characteristics (Elad, et al., 1994), urbanization (Plantinga and Miller, 2001) and 
site characteristics (Xu and Barkley, 1993 and Boisvert, et al., 1997). Those studies 
could not analyze the PRTs which consist of mutual dealings of farmers, so the 
response model of individual farmers estimated from micro-data should be used. 
However, estimating the production function or hedonic price function from micro-
data might have not succeeded due to the affects of the differences of individual 
farmers that were hardly measured as tangible variables. It is also impossible to 
specify why farmland is so inelastic in agricultural production by those methods, 
though those methods provide interesting fact findings about the farmland 
situations. Additionally, analyzing market situations with mixture data of SD, which 
is common in those methods̍, causes the identification problem especially regarding 
to the restricted market like Japanese farmland situations that the local 
governments have controlled the rental rates in order to protect the farmland 
possession right of farmers. A lack of data is also recognized in the statistics on 
farmland situation affected by PC projects and this becomes a bottleneck for 
empirical studies. Even the Survey of Rice Production Cost (Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fishery; MAFF), which was used in many of the previous analyses, 
includes no information on consolidation field areas.   
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the project effects by modeling both 
supply and demand (S-D) sides of farmland renting from micro-data. To overcome 
low variability of the actual rental rate data, the contingent valuation (CV) method 
is employed to estimate the S-D functions in PRTs and ideal equilibriums of S-D are 
discussed by simulating the effects of PC projects (Kunimitsu, 2003) regarding to 
policy issues in Japan. 
< Fig. 1. A paddy-field consolidation project. > 
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Survey Design and Data Sources 
To obtain variable farmer reactions to the different rental rate, the CV 
questionnaire survey was designed for individual farmers whose paddy-fields were 
consolidated by PC projects two years before the survey. The question asked to the 
supply side farmers was as follows. 
“If you had a chance to rent one parcel of paddy field (dA) to another farmer, 
would you accept the rental rate Bs yen/ha/year?”   
Demand side farmers were asked the following question. 
“If you had a chance to hire one parcel of paddy field (dA) from another farmer, 
would you pay the rental rate 
d B1  yen/ha/year? Assume that you could use other 
agricultural machinery in addition to your own and employ help to cultivate the 
field, if needed. Also, assume that the obligation rate of the set aside program is 
equal to the average rate for your town.” 
Regarding Japanese rice production, demand side farmers are far less than supply 
side farmers although their rental areas from other farmers are larger and their 
needs of renting are greater than supply side. Hence, the estimation error of the 
demand function will become larger due to a smaller amount of data. To improve 
statistical efficiency, a double bounded question was employed (Hanemann et. al., 
1991). A second question that depended on the response to the first question was as 
follows.  
“If you accept the above situation, are you going to pay higher rental rate (
d
H B2  
yen/ha/year) for the rental field?” or, “If you reject the above situation, can you 
pay less rental rate (
d
L B2   yen/ha/year) for the rental field?” 
In these questions, one parcel of paddy-field for rent (dA) was assumed to be 0.3 ha 
for Consolidated Fields (CF) and 0.1 ha for Non-consolidated Fields (NF). These 
areas are common in Japanese paddy-fields. 
   A simple “yes-no” responses to above questions were asked to S-D farmers to   6
realize the actual PRTs. Five rental rates for  B were prepared, i.e. 50, 100, 200, 
400, and 700 thousand yen/ha/year, and each value was proposed to each group of 
farmers that were classified randomly as the same number. Questions for both the 
S-D sides were asked about both NF, wherein a paddy-field was under bad 
conditions before the PC project, and CF, wherein a paddy field was under good 
conditions after the project. Thus, four kinds of data were collected, i.e. (supply or 
demand side)  ʷ (NF  or  CF). 
   The cross-sectional data were composed from the survey of farmers conducted by 
Japan Institute of Irrigation and Drainage (JIID) with the assistance of MAFF in 
December 1999 (JIID, 2000). A total of 118 research sites were selected from 
throughout Japan except for Hokkaido and Okinawa where the management style 
and rice varieties are different from those of the other regions. The average project 
area was over 100 ha of paddy-fields, and most of the project sites were located in 
the flat plain areas. The questionnaires were distributed to farmers who owned 
paddy-fields in the project sites. Average management scale of the farmers 
corresponded to the average figure for mainland Japan according to the Agricultural 
Census (MAFF). The results of the survey are shown in Table 2. 
<Table 1 Questionnaire Results>   
 
Empirical model 
The empirical model employed here consists of i) the S-D functions that show 
decision making of farmers for renting based on individual differences of production 
conditions and ii) the simulation of the S-D equilibrium as ideal rental agreements. 
Stochastic functions were used in previous agricultural production analyses in order 
to introduce individual differences of farmers into an equation (Kumbhakar, 1994 
and Chambers and Quiggin, 2002). These analyses needed a convergence process, 
which sometimes failed, in the estimation of function to identify those differences   7
that are not obtained in actual data. In this study, the S-D function for renting was 
directly estimated to secure the estimation of farmer responses to PRTs after 
deriving those functions from the stochastic production function and by modifying 
them to the stochastic choice type model. 
   Each farmer is assumed to produce rice (Q) according to the Cobb-Douglas 
production function, such that  ) exp(u aA Q
d c b E V = , ) 1 ( < +c b , with pre-fixed 
farmland (A), other input factors (V) and social and geographical influences (E). Here, 
bold character shows the vector, and a, b, c and d are parameters which relate to the 
rice production structure. Variable u is the stochastic element which represents 
technological gaps among farmers, relating to differences in skills, knowledge and 
experiences of individual farmers, inherited farmland quality and amount of 
information from consumers. The existence of the technological gaps makes farmers 
decide differently even if they have the same management conditions. Given that 
farmers try to maximize the profit  V PV − = PQ R  under the technical constraints of 
the production function, the first order condition with regard to V is  ) / ( V PV ∂ ∂ = Q P  
) exp(
1 u PacA
d c b E V
− = , where PV is the price of V and P is the price of rice. 
Since A is restricted for farmers, the optimum rental rate PA(WTP) is different 
among farmers according to their management conditions. The optimum rental rate 
PA(WTP), e.g. willingly paid by individual farmers, is assumed to be decided by the 
marginal productivity of farmland as  = ) (WTP A P   ) / ( A Q P ∂ ∂ , that is, 



















































ε . Consequently, the rental rate can be decomposed into two parts: a 
systematic element which is a linear index of the variable matrix X, and a 
stochastic element Џ which represents intangible influences on the rental rate   8
but is different from the observation error. 
When a farmer cultivates farmland  0 A   initially and rents one parcel of 
additional farmland dA , the farmland area after renting is  dA A A ± = 0  ( dA is 
negative for the supply side and positive for the demand side). 
Since  Џ in Eq. (1) is not error term, this function is hardly estimated with 
market data because of the lack of data variability and the S-D separability. To 
specify this equation from the CV questionnaire data, Eq. (1) should be modified to 
stochastic choice type function. It is reasonable to presume that the supply side 
farmer would agree with the rental rate (
s B ) proposed in the questionnaire, if the 
proposed value was higher than 
s
WTP A P ) (  in Eq. (1). Given that the distribution of 
technological gaps shown by Џ is i.i.d. with zero means, the probabilities of 
acceptance are defined by using the cumulative density function G as follows: 
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Here and subsequently, the superscripts “s” and “d” show the S-D side, respectively. 
A symbol  М  shows the standard deviation of  Џ, and  Ѝ and  β are parameters. 
The demand side farmers would accept the proposed rental rate (
d B  for first bit, 
Bd2H and Bd2L for second bit), if the rate is lower than 
d
WTP A P ) (   in Eq. (1). The demand 
function can be defined as a stochastic type in the same way as the supply side as 
follows. 
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WTP A B G B P β X − = ≤ γ                   ( 3 ) .  
Parameters can be estimated by the maximum likelihood estimation method 
with the log sum of the likelihood composed by response models as above. Expected 
signs of coefficients are as follows. The rational farmers lead the acceptance 
probability to  0 / > ∂ ∂
s s B π  and  0 / < ∂ ∂
d d B π .  = ∂ ∂ P
s / π )} ( / { ⋅ ∂ ∂ G
s π } / ) ( { P G ∂ ⋅ ∂  is 
less than 0, because the first differential on right hand of the equation is positive. 
The second differential is negative due to the negative sign in the function G(ɾ) and 
e>0 in Eq. (1). Also,  0 / > ∂ ∂ P
d π  due to  0 ) ( / < ⋅ ∂ ∂ G
d π  in Eq. (3). Similarly, the 
negative sign of c’ brings about  0 / > ∂ ∂ V P
s π  and  0 / < ∂ ∂ V P
d π . The signs of  A ∂ ∂ / π  
in both the S-D sides cannot be determined in advance, because these signs are 
related not only to the parameter b’ of diminishing returns but also the total factor 
productivity a’. If the total factor productivity changes in proportion to A, the affect 
of diminishing returns may be overwhelmed and the sign of  A ∂ ∂ / π   may become the 
same as  A PA ∂ ∂ / , but the signs of  A ∂ ∂ / π  may  be  opposite  of  V P ∂ ∂ / π .  
Equation (2) and (3) are the survival functions regarding to the proposed rental 
rates for one farm parcel of dA (ha), so the acceptance probability corresponds to the 
number rate of farmers who accept the proposed rental rate in PRTs. Since all 
parcels of farmland are assumed to be the same area and a standard shape, 
acceptance probability would correspond to the number rate of farmland parcels, 
consequently area rate of rented farmland. The ideal equilibrium of the S-D sides is 
defined at the intersection of the S-D functions̎). At this point, the equilibrium 
rental rate (
* B ) and rental area ( dA N ×
* ) are decided 
as,   )   Pr(   ) (
* * dA N P B dA N
s d
WTP A × × > = ×  ) Pr(   ) (
* d
WTP A P B ≤ =  dA N n
d × × × Here, 
* N  shows 
the number of rented parcels of farmland within a project site. Ns and Nd are the 
total numbers of farmland parcel participated in bidding for the S-D sides,   10
respectively. In detail, transactions at one project site are assumed to be divided into 
‘n’ parts of bidding, and large-scale farmers can participate in every bidding, but 
small scale farmers can participate only once in one of the bidding opportunities due 
to the small farmland area for bidding. In practice, n is assumed to correspond to 
the ratio (N s / Nd )̏), then, 
] - ) ln( [ 1   ] - ) ln( G[   /
* d * s * d d s s s B G B N N β X β X γ γ − = =    (4). 
  )   Pr( ) (
* d
WTP A P B >  and  ) Pr( ) (
* d
WTP A P B ≤  are substituted by stochastic function using the 
average value of explanatory variables X, supposing that all related farmers in 
each sides would be distributed consistently. 
 
Estimation Results of S-D Functions 
Table 2 shows the candidates for the explanatory variables of Eqs. (2) and (3). 
The prices of agricultural machinery, fertilizers, and pesticides were not included as 
candidates, because these prices correspond to nationwide market prices and have 
little variability among farmers (unified by the constant of the equation). 
Tables 3 and 4 show estimation results of the S-D functions in both the NF and 
CF, respectively. Insignificant variables were excluded as compared to t-statistic at 
15% level. Coefficients of the proposed rental rate in both tables are significant as 
compared to t-statistic and show the correct signs based on the theoretical 
framework. Comparing the coefficients in NF and CF shows that the CF have 
greater value in both the S-D sides. Clearly, both S-D farmers reacted to the rental 
rates more sharply after the PC projects. These changes are shown more concretely 
by the rental rate elasticity to acceptance probability at the indifferent points where 
acceptance probabilities correspond to 0.5. The values of elasticity in the NF were 
0.34 (supply) and -0.39 (demand); those values in the CF were 0.44 (supply) and -
0.63 (demand). Thus, both elasticity values in the CF were higher than in the NF, 
but all values were less than 1.0 indicating inelasticity. An inelastic structure in   11
farmland derived demand was also shown by previous studies that estimated the 
trans-log cost function of aggregated agricultural production̐). 
As for the estimated coefficients of rice price and wages, the positive coefficient 
shifts both S-D functions toward the right in the price-quantity graph, showing 
lower and higher affects on acceptance probabilities on the S-D sides, respectively. 
Thus, the higher price in rice and lower wages tend to encourage both S-D farmers 
to easily accept a high rental rate in spite of different signs in coefficients of the 
estimated equations. The farmland area A has a negative affect on the supply and a 
positive affect on demand. As discussed in the former section, the coefficient of this 
variable can take positive and negative signs, but should take opposite signs 
between S-D. Therefore, the estimation results do not contradict the theoretical 
framework.  
Estimated coefficients of geographical classification show that farmers on the 
supply side in urban areas tended to rent their paddy-fields at a high rental rate. 
This is because the rental rate was raised by strong intention for the land use 
conversion of farmers (Shogenji; 1998). However, the situation was the reverse in 
LFAs, showing the low rental rate and easy renting from other farmers. 
<Table 2    Candidates of Variables for Estimation in Eqs. (3) and (4)> 
<Table 3. Estimation of the Supply Functions.> 
   <Table  4.  Estimation  of  the  Demand  Functions.> 
 
Simulation 
Figure 2 shows the S-D curves derived from Eq. (2) and (3) in the NF (S0, D0) 
and in the CF (S1, D1). Points A and B show the ideal equilibrium of PRTs for the 
NF and CF, respectively. Comparing point A to B indicates that the rental rate 
increased by four times and rental area increased by 40% because of the PC projects. 
Point C shows the supply-side effect in which the demand function was stable while   12
the supply function shifted after the projects. Comparing point C to A demonstrates 
that the rental rate increased by 50% and rental area decreased by 27% because of 
the projects. This is because farmers restarted cultivating their own paddy-fields 
with increased incentive when conditions of their paddy-fields were bettered by the 
projects (JIID, 2000). Furthermore, the burden for the PC project costs made it 
impossible to rent their paddy-fields to others with low rental rate (Tanada, 1993). 
On the contrary, comparing point A to D showing the demand effect only suggests 
that both the rental rate and rental area increased by 190% and 70%, respectively. 
This is because large-scale farmers could attain efficient production with a high 
rental rate and larger rental area after the projects. Consequently, the rental rate 
highly increased with synergism of S-D effects and the rental area was improved 
moderately because of the PC projects with greater increase in the demand effect 
than decrease in the supply effect, in spite of S-D effects offsetting each other. 
Table 6, calculated form the mean value of the explanatory variables in each 
region, reveals that the simulated rental rates correspond to the actual values and 
the orders of simulated values and actual values are almost the same. Most of the 
simulated rental areas are almost the same as the actual values, indicating 
considerable applicability of this model, except for the Tokai region̑). It is clear that 
rental rates increased drastically in all regions after the projects, especially in 
Tohoku, Kanto and Hokuriku, but, rental areas increased moderately in all regions. 
The increases in the rental areas of Tokai, Kinki, Chyu-Sikoku and Hokuriku were 
remarkable as compared to other regions. Therefore, the eastern part of Japan 
including Tohoku, Kanto and Hokuriku tends to attain high project effects that 
appear in the rental rate rather than the rental area, but the western part of Japan 
tends to attain high project effects in the rental area. 
Table 6 also shows that the simulated rental rates of all regions were lower than 
the actual values, especially in NF. Five out of seven regions attained a higher   13
rental area by the simulation that shows ideal transactions. A transaction cost in the 
rental market may be caused by miss-adjustment between farmers and regulation 
by the government. However, from the gaps between the simulated values and 
actual values, the transaction cost seems to not be serious in the CF but serious in 
the NF. Therefore, it can be concluded that the PC projects reduced the transaction 
cost in the rental market. 
   Table 7 shows the influences of low rice price, high wages and geographical 
situation on the project effects. The low price of rice and high wages brought about 
low rental rates and low rental areas in both NF and CF, but the decreases in these 
indexes were remarkable in the CF. As a result, the effects of the PC projects shown 
by the differences in rental rate become lower than the whole country (status quo) in 
comparison of average situations, especially in the case of decrease in rice price. As 
for geographical situations, the project effects on the rental rate in SUAs were 
higher, but the project effects on the rental area in SUAs were lower. Conversely, the 
effects in LFAs appeared through the rise in the rental area rather than the rental 
rate.  
<Figure 2. Changes in supply and demand by the PC projects in PRTs. > 
<Table 5.    Regional effects of the PC projects (at equilibrium).> 
<Table 6.    Influence of outside factors on effects of PC projects.> 
 
Conclusions and Future Subjects 
Applying the stochastic choice model to the regulated market including PRTs is 
useful for analyzing the capitalization mechanisms of PC projects and for evaluating 
causative factors.   
One of the remarkable results is that the PC project effects appears as a marked 
increase in the rental rate and a moderate increase in the rental area, in spite of the 
negative effect at supply side overwhelmed by the positive effect of the demand side   14
farmers. In addition, the PC projects can ease the transaction costs, which came 
from miss-adjustment between farmers and affected the rental transactions severely, 
by making paddy-fields usage more flexible. Second, regional differences in 
agricultural and social situations bring about regional differences in the project 
effects. Namely, the project effects in the eastern part of Japan tend to appear as 
high rental rates because both S-D farmers have a strong will to continue their 
cultivation and outer situations such as the rice price and monoculture of rice suit 
their will. On the other hand, the project effects in the western part of Japan appear 
as large rental areas because the small average farmland area and many varieties of 
crops make it easy for farmers to rent their paddy-fields to other farmers. Third, a 
decrease in rice price negatively influences in the project effects. This may be a 
dilemma, that is, the PC projects are needed to improve rice productivity, but the 
d e c r e a s e  o f  r i c e  p r i c e  d e r i v e d  f r o m  h i g h  r i c e  p r o d u c t i v i t y  b r i n g s  a b o u t  n e g a t i v e  
effects on the PC projects. Additionally, a change in the project site to LFAs makes 
the project effect appear higher in the rental area than the rental rate. This 
indicates the PC projects can be useful for protecting against farmland 
abandonment caused by a lack of rental demanders in LFAs. 
Finally, there is a need for further investigation to apply other kinds of 
distribution functions to the model, to improve questionnaire items and to test 
uniformity of the market structure. Furthermore, this model may be applicable to 
analysis of the price of water, which has not been evaluated empirically, but 
constitutes an important factor in agricultural production. 
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Figure 2. Changes in supply and demand by the PC projects in PRTs.   17
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Data: SRPC ; Survey of Rice Production Cost by MAFF, AC ; Agricultural 
Census by MAFF, JIID; Research of JIID 
Note:1. ”Agress” becomes 1 in the case of a farmer who enlarges his or her 
farmland to more than 20% after consolidation, or 0 in otherwise. 
2. “Other Regions” consist of Tohoku (6 pref.), Kanto (7 Pref.) and 
Kyushu (6 pref.).   18
Table 3.    Estimation of the supply functions. 
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  	 

)PLVSJLV  	 
  	 

5PLBJ  	 
  	 

,JOLJ   	 















Note: Significant at 5% level(“**”), at 1% level(“*”). 
 
 
Table 4.    Estimation of the demand functions. 
&TU$PFGG &TU$PFGG
$POTUBOU   
  	 

MO	#
   
  	 

MO	1
   
  	 

MO	1 -
   
  	 

MO	"E"
   
  	 

"HSFTT   
  	 

"HF   
  	 











Note: Significant at 5% level(“**”), at 10% level(“*”). 
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5PIPLV         
,BOUP         
)PLVSJLV         
5PLBJ         
,JOOLJ         
$IZV4JLPLV         
,ZVTZV         




















Note: 1. Actual values came from previous research data (JIID 2000). 
2. The estimation values are calculated by using the average values of 
explanatory variables in each region. 
 
 
Table 7.    Influence of outside factors on effects of PC projects. 
	ZFOIBZFBSɼ3BUF

/PO$POT "GUFS$POT "GUFS/PO /PO$POT "GUFS$POT "GUFS/PO
%FDMFBTFJO3JDF1SJDF
	
      
*ODSFBTFJO8BHFT
	ʴ
      
4VCVSCBO"SFBT      
-FTT'BWPSFE"SFBT      
8IPMF	DPSSFTQPOEUP
UIFTUBUVTRVP
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<Foot Note> 
                                            
̍  The hedonic model has the reduced form of supply and demand (S-D) functions and each 
factor of S-D cannot be specified by this method as explained by Brown and Rosen (1982). 
 
̎  The actual rental market may be too small to ensure market equilibrium, but Rustichini, et al. 
(1994) showed that the indeterminacy or inefficiency caused by trader bargaining behavior in a 
small market vanishes rapidly under a uniform price double auction with more than six or three 
traders per side. 
 
̏  According to the data on site, the rate n is approximately eight on the average, that is, one 
demand side farmer rented from eight small scale farmers. This rate differs in sites of the 
project, but appears stable for many years. Therefore, n rarely affects the equilibrium values 
even in the actual transactions. 
 
̐  The elasticity in this paper is different from conventional production function, but the 
following features were found if this point was ignored for the comparison. That is, the elasticity 
for factor demand of paddy-field estimated by Ito (1993) during the period 1988-90 was 0.06-
0.69 for the small-scale farmers and 0.72-0.84 for the large-scale farmers. These values are 
similar to the estimation values calculated above for 1999. Godo (1993) also showed that the 
elasticity value of large-scale farmers was larger than that of small-scale farmers. 
 
̑  Many cooperative groups for agricultural production were established in the Tokai region, 
and their management area exceeds the project site. Also, their large cultivation area makes the 
number of data lower than other regions. Therefore, the actual rate of the rental agreement 
level in Table 6 should be considered with some limitations. 
 